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Does Wittgenstein have a Method?  
The Challenges of Conant and Schulte 
 
Abstract 
Does Wittgenstein have a method? There are two challenges to an 
affirmative answer. One is put forth by Schulte, who claims that 
Wittgenstein’s method is little more than a skill, and thus not a 
method in any ambitious sense of that word. Another is Conant’s view 
that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein entertains not one 
method, but a variety of methods. I tackle these challenges by 
questioning what I take to be their presupposed conceptions of 
‘method’ and conclude that we can indeed speak of Wittgenstein’s 
method in an interesting sense. Thereby, the concept of method will be 
elucidated and the sense in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy has a 
method clarified. 
 
Introduction 
Wittgenstein’s methodological considerations belong to his most 
important contributions to philosophy. These considerations 
suggest that there is a method which informs the work of the later 
Wittgenstein. That claim, however, has been challenged in two 
ways. Schulte calls into doubt the idea that the later Wittgenstein 
had a method in any ambitious sense of the word (2002). For 
Schulte, Wittgenstein did at best have a method in a non-ambitious 
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sense, which is little more than the skill of dealing with 
philosophical problems. Schulte gives two reasons: The first is that 
Wittgenstein has not provided an illuminating description of his 
method at any stage of his thinking. The second is that there is no 
theory in the framework of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and that 
methods in some way require theories. Conant maintains that, for 
the later Wittgenstein, there is not one method, but a multitude of 
methods (2012). Conant provides two reasons. The first is his 
reading of PI §133, which states that “there is not a single 
philosophical method”. The second is his insistence that a plurality 
of grammars require a plurality of methods. The aim of this essay is 
exegetical and I will defend three interpretative claims against the 
challenges of Schulte and Conant. First, Wittgenstein did employ a 
method that provides general guidelines for practising philosophy; 
second, he did reflect on his method, which is embodied in his 
methodological remarks; third, what he takes to be his method 
does not diverge substantially from his employment of it. 
To show what is the issue, let me give a brief description of my 
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s method: Philosophy is concerned 
with questions of sense, and not with questions of truth. A 
philosophical problem is a misunderstanding or a lack of 
understanding of the meaning of some words.
1
 Their meaning is 
closely connected to the use that relevant speakers make of these 
words (sometimes, the same sign has a different use for different 
groups of speakers or even individual speakers). However, the 
explanations of the meaning of words which a person gives cannot 
be accepted without further ado; they might incorporate 
philosophical mistakes and misunderstandings and are the raw 
material for philosophy. Nevertheless, the use of words provides the 
basis for deciding whether there is a philosophical problem, a 
misunderstanding of the grammar of language, and what a correct 
understanding amounts to. A person can be aware that something 
                                                          
1 This does not imply that all misunderstandings are philosophical problems; let alone that 
every lack of understanding is a philosophical problem. For instance, many 
misunderstandings due to phonetic similarities are not philosophical. But in every 
philosophical investigation, a flaw in the understanding is at issue – be it an actual 
misunderstanding, or a lack of understanding that is problematised by a prudent person 
before she has fallen into misunderstanding. 
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is amiss, resulting in disquietude, or she might be unaware. In the 
latter case, her use can be problematised by an interlocutor.2 
The use of words as basis for philosophical investigations is one of 
five central elements of Wittgenstein’s method. The other four are 
the nature of philosophical problems, what the aim of philosophy is, 
and the sources of problems as well as the means to resolve them. A 
philosophical problem is a misunderstanding of the use of words. 
The aim is to attain complete clarity, that is, a completely clear 
understanding of the use of the relevant words, in such a way that 
the initial misunderstanding is resolved. Complete clarity is not the 
same as comprehensiveness, the idea that all potential problems 
need to be solved. In that way, philosophy is closely tied to 
individual persons. We cannot resolve philosophical problems once 
and for all, but have to deal with a philosophical problem in 
relation to the person who has it. Moreover, there is a further 
diagnostically relevant category: the sources of philosophical 
problems. The diverse means, methods or procedures to dispel the 
misunderstanding must not only take into account the 
philosophical problem, but also the sources of the problem. Thus, 
different means may be employed for the same philosophical 
problem, if the latter has more than one source. 
Some of the sources that Wittgenstein mentions are: the craving 
for generality (BBB 17), the search for definitions where no 
definition is possible (PI §65f), being held captive by a picture (PI 
§115), the lack of surveyability (PI §122), the tendency of 
interpreting a use of a word as a strange process (PI §196), a diet of 
too few examples (PI §593), and a misleading surface grammar (PI 
§664). Further, once the sources of a problem are singled out, the 
philosopher may choose the means or methods most appropriate to 
deal with these sources and with the problem. Some of the means 
that Wittgenstein employs or recommends are: inventing language 
games (PI §2, 48), comparing the grammar of two words (PI §78) 
or substituting one form of expression for another (PI §90) (for a 
longer list, see section 5). 
                                                          
2 There are, of course, different interpretations, for instance Hilmy (1987), Glock (1991), 
Baker (2004), Baker / Hacker (2005), Morris (2007), Kuusela (2008) or Horwich (2012). 
Sebastian Wyss  CC-BY 
 170 
What is the sense of method used in my affirmation that 
Wittgenstein has “a method of philosophy”? He has an overarching 
method. That is a method which guides the invention and the 
application of particular methods or procedures to particular 
philosophical problems. A short note on my terminology: Since 
these particular procedures may also be called “methods”, I don’t 
distinguish between methods and procedures but between 
overarching and problem-oriented methods. (Procedures are 
problem-oriented methods.) Problem-oriented methods are means 
for the resolution of particular philosophical problems. The 
overarching method is a general strategy for how to deal with new 
problems: Determine what the philosophical problem is by looking 
at the use that a person makes of words (see whether what she says 
makes sense), check for sources of the problem and try out some 
means (without guarantee of success) to reach the aim of complete 
clarity. 
Importantly, the method that I ascribe to Wittgenstein is not 
foundational. It is not the case that the method is the axiomatic 
foundation of philosophy, and once we get the method right, all 
philosophical problems will be resolved in due course. In that case, 
the method would become an unjustifiable monolith. This is not 
the role that Wittgenstein accords to his method. For him, 
questions about method are an integral part of philosophy – 
discussing them is itself nothing else than doing philosophy (cf. PI 
§121). Nevertheless, his philosophy and his method are not without 
presuppositions (cf. Glock 2007: 59). Problems and questions 
about them are to be treated like any other philosophical question. 
This implies that Wittgenstein’s method is vulnerable to attacks on 
its presuppositions: If it turns out that meaning has no connection 
whatsoever to use, his method loses its appeal. 
I begin by telling two different stories about the development of 
Wittgenstein’s thought in the 1930s (section 1). Then I consider 
Schulte’s position and state my reasons for not being convinced by 
it (section 2). In section 3, I trace a strict dichotomy of two kinds 
of methods as a source for Schulte’s refusal to acknowledge that 
Wittgenstein had a method and provide an alternative taxonomy of 
methods. Next, I discuss Conant’s position and argue against his 
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claim that grammars require methods (section 4). Finally, I turn to 
perhaps the most salient objection to my position: the 
interpretative challenge which is posed by PI §133 (section 5). 
1. Continuity vs. discontinuity 
A prima facie difficulty for interpretations that deny that 
Wittgenstein had a method (Schulte and Conant) is that from 1930 
up to 1938 there are many passages about method in the Nachlass. 
There are remarks in which he speaks about his method (TS 225: 2, 
MWL 113), in which he ascribes central importance to it (LWL 21) 
or in which he, in succinct form, states what his method is: 
“Methode der Philosophie: Die übersichtliche Darstellung der 
grammatischen Tatsachen” (BT 414) and “My method throughout 
is to point out mistakes in language” (AWL 27). There is an 
obvious line of defence, which both Schulte and Conant take: They 
claim that Wittgenstein’s views about method changed between the 
early and the late 30s. In a rough sense, we can separate a middle 
from a later Wittgenstein: The middle Wittgenstein was under the 
illusion that his way of doing philosophy was guided by one method 
and ascribed central importance to it. The later Wittgenstein 
avoided that illusion and, with the exception of (PI §133), stopped 
talking about method. Schulte and Conant give different accounts 
of the illusion. For Schulte, the middle Wittgenstein wrongly 
compared chemistry with philosophy in respect of method and 
thus ends up with demands that his method cannot meet (2002: 
404-6). Conant, on the other hand, sees a close connection between 
grammar and method: A plurality of grammatical forms requires a 
plurality of methods. The middle Wittgenstein’s insistence on both 
a plurality of grammatical forms and on there being one method 
brings tension into his philosophy (2012: 633). I will comment 
briefly on two of the most striking passages in the work of the 
middle Wittgenstein. The first is taken from lecture notes from 
1930: 
The nimbus of philosophy has been lost. For we now have a method 
of doing philosophy, and can speak of skilful philosophers. Compare 
the difference between alchemy and chemistry; chemistry has a 
method and we can speak of skilful chemists. But once a method has 
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been found the opportunities for the expression of personality are 
correspondingly restricted. (LWL 21) 
In this passage, Wittgenstein intimates that philosophy has 
undergone a great change, brought about by himself, and specifies 
the difference as one of doing philosophy without a method versus 
doing philosophy with a method. The introduction of a method in 
philosophy brings sense to speaking of skilful philosophers. 
Thereby, the philosophers lose their nimbus; they are only skilfully 
applying a method, not expressing their personality in their work. 
The second passage is from an early version of the preface of 
the PI. In this version, there is an additional passage which did not 
make it into the final version: 
Ich beginne diese Veröffentlichung mit dem Fragment meines letzten 
Versuchs, meine philosophischen Gedanken in eine Reihe zu ordnen. 
Dies Fragment hat vielleicht den Vorzug, verhältnismässig leicht einen 
Begriff von meiner Methode vermitteln zu können. (TS 225: 2, cited 
after Schulte 2002) 
The fragment to which Wittgenstein refers in this passage could 
either be the whole body of the text of the Frühfassung (TS 220 & 
221), or the first half of it (TS 220), or a segment of TS 220 (cf. 
Schulte 2002: 400). The later omission of this passage is relevant to 
my discussion, because it apparently removes the only allusion to 
the method from the preface, which, in turn, reduces the 
occurrence of the word “method” to a few paragraphs of the body 
of the PI. 
Turning the tables, Schulte and Conant now demand an 
explanation from interpreters who claim that Wittgenstein has a 
method: Why are such passages absent or even omitted from the 
PI? Here is my explanation: Broadly speaking, there is a shift from 
middle Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the discovery of the one 
method to his refraining from emphasising such a discovery later 
on. This, however, does not mean that the later Wittgenstein does 
not have a method. I see one main reason for the shift: 
Wittgenstein’s continuous concerns about his own vanity. 
Proclaiming that one has found “the method of philosophy”, that 
after 2000 years of history, one has finally brought philosophy onto 
the right path, even if true, is a claim that is easily seen as 
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demonstrating vanity. Accordingly, it is replaced by a more humble 
one: “a method is now demonstrated by examples” (PI §133; see 
section 5). Whether this method can sustain the claim that it is the 
right one depends, among others, on its ability to solve 
philosophical problems. 
More importantly, the shift isn’t as substantial as one might 
think: the later Wittgenstein may have a method without saying that 
he has one. The possibility exists that the remarks in the 
Investigations that concern methodology amount to a method. If they 
fulfil our requirements for being a method, then there is no 
obstacle to identifying a method in Wittgenstein’s later work. That 
of course depends on the notion of method, which will be discussed 
in section 3. 
At this stage, both readings have a story that is prima facie 
plausible. However, the account that Schulte and Conant give of 
the alleged illusion of which middle Wittgenstein was a victim has 
to be scrutinised. They think, in their respective versions, that 
Wittgenstein had good reasons to give up the talk of “the method 
of philosophy”. As I will show below, the reasons that they present 
are not convincing. 
2. Schulte: “Little more than a skill” 
Schulte’s main contention is that the method which plays such an 
important role for middle Wittgenstein is in fact “little more than 
the skill itself” (2002: 405), or even that it is “a method basically 
amounting to a special type of skill” (2002: 406). The core passage 
to which Schulte alludes is the one cited above (LWL 21). There, 
Wittgenstein compares two sets of differences: on the one hand the 
difference between a philosophy that has a method and a 
philosophy that has none, and on the other the difference between 
alchemy and chemistry. The way Schulte reads this passage is very 
peculiar. On the one hand, he takes the cue “skill” from it, in order 
to claim that Wittgenstein’s philosophy has no ambitious method 
(see below), but that what can be learned from Wittgenstein is a 
special type of skill. On the other, he claims that in that very 
passage, Wittgenstein is the victim of a “self-misunderstanding of 
his method” (Schulte 2002: 406). 
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The picture that Schulte draws is the following: A skill requires 
a framework for its exercise. For chemistry, the framework includes 
a theory. Since, for Wittgenstein, philosophy has nothing to do 
with scientific or quasi-scientific theories, the framework of 
philosophy does not contain a theory. Rather, it is “at most a kind 
of tradition, an institution or a common background” (Schulte 
2002: 404). Now, at least in the quoted passage, Wittgenstein draws 
a sharp contrast between traditional philosophy and a new way of 
doing philosophy (like the contrast between alchemy and 
chemistry). So there is a new element, which does not belong to 
tradition, the old institution or the common background. Schulte 
concedes that “Wittgenstein felt that he had discovered something”, 
and he compares this discovery to the discovery of 
a [new] style of painting, a method of playing the violin, or a new form 
of cuisine. No one will expect you to be able to give an informative 
account of that sort of style or method [...] His failure to produce 
anything like a satisfactory account of this method would have made it 
clear from the beginning that to the extent he really had found a new 
method it was a method of the second kind, that is, a method basically 
amounting to a special type of skill. (Schulte 2002: 405) 
In effect, Schulte sees a mismatch between middle Wittgenstein’s 
description of his method and his practice: that the latter is not 
guided by an ambitious method, as the description would have it.
3
 
Schulte distinguishes between two kinds of method. Those 
methods which are a mere skill (or not much more) and those 
which are (considerably) more than a mere skill. The latter are 
called “method[s] in an ambitious sense” (Schulte 2002: 406), and 
the former we may call methods in a non-ambitious sense. Note 
that it is not per se clear how “method in an ambitious sense” 
(henceforth “ambitious method”) has to be understood. What 
Schulte does not have in mind are methods with ambitious goals. 
For Schulte, there may be non-ambitious methods with ambitious 
goals. If Wittgenstein conceived of his method as one that could be 
used to resolve all philosophical problems, his goals are certainly 
                                                          
3  Ironically, Dummett saw a similar mismatch in the work of the later Wittgenstein, 
though in the opposite direction: that his practice includes theses even though his 
description suggests otherwise (1978: 434, 452). 
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ambitious. But, according to Schulte, his method is not of the 
ambitious sort. Thus, “ambitious method” is best understood as 
being defined as more than a mere skill. 
There is an issue concerning the notion of skill as it is used by 
Schulte. Do skills belong to the qualities of a person? In that case, 
we could say: “He is generous, arrogant, tall, and has an amazing 
skill as a sculptor.” If so, there is tension with the standard 
explanation of “method” as a way of doing things (by OED, 
Macmillan and Merriam-Webster). As such, a method is not a 
quality of a person, and it becomes questionable how non-
ambitious methods are methods at all. That is why Schulte’s “skill” 
has to be understood as “craft”: An art, profession, occupation or 
trade that involves a skill. The sentence “The craft of 
cabinetmaking was much admired in colonial times” refers to a 
trade or profession, and not to the skill employed in that trade. 
Then “method in the non-ambitious sense” is compatible with the 
above notion of method: Do it in the way of goldsmiths, or 
cabinetmakers, or philosophers. 
What does it mean for a method to be a mere skill, to be a non-
ambitious type of method? Based on the picture above, we can 
isolate two features. (i) The application of non-ambitious methods 
is not connected to a theory. (ii) Non-ambitious methods do not 
require an illuminating description to be taught and passed on. 
Accordingly, in Schulte’s picture, we find two arguments why 
middle Wittgenstein was wrong in thinking that he had a method in 
an ambitious sense, and why the later Wittgenstein does not have 
such a method: 
I) Wittgenstein’s philosophy doesn’t have a theory in its framework, 
therefore it has no method in the ambitious sense in its framework.  
II) Wittgenstein didn’t give an informative account of his method, 
therefore he has no method in the ambitious sense. 
Ad I: With which sense of theory does this argument work? 
Following Hanfling (2004), two senses of “theory” might be 
relevant here. The first are causal-hypothetical theories, as they are 
common in empirical sciences, such as the postulation of an 
unobserved body which explains the movement of visible planets 
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and comets. If Schulte uses “theory” in that sense, then all non-
naturalistic philosophy is excluded from having a method or 
methodology. That, of course, would be a harsh consequence. The 
second sense might be called quasi-scientific. Unlike the first kind, 
such theories do not offer causal explanations. Similar to it, they try 
to explain (in a non-causal sense) phenomena by postulating 
“entities or processes that do not lie open to view” (Hanfling 2004: 
189). In this second sense, Schulte’s requirement is tailor-made to 
exclude Wittgenstein’s philosophy from having a method. Postulate 
hidden entities or you will have no theory and therefore no 
method. But then, Schulte’s requirement for an ambitious method 
to have a theory is itself problematic. Wittgenstein’s method is 
excluded from being a method on the grounds of one of its own 
features: its special status regarding theories. 
Ad II: I take it that the alleged absence of an illuminating 
description is not sufficient proof that a particular method is of the 
non-ambitious kind. Rather, it is circumstantial evidence to that 
effect. Accordingly, there can be an illuminating description of a 
particular method even if the method is non-ambitious. I disagree 
because the required circumstantial evidence is missing. In my 
opinion, Wittgenstein’s reflections on his method are of great 
interest and constitute an illuminating description. To sketch my 
reasons: In the Investigations, there are many remarks that contain 
informative descriptions of Wittgenstein’s method, most 
prominently in the so called “philosophy chapter” (PI §89-133), as 
well as in solitary remarks such as PI §§52, 254-255, 309, 314, 340, 
371, 387, 464, 599, and 664. Indeed, these passages are difficult to 
interpret due to the “nature of the investigation” (PI pref.), 
Wittgenstein’s laconic predilections and the different voices of the 
work make it difficult to read. But for instance in PI §§89 and 90, 
he provides a sketch of the kind of investigation a philosophical 
investigation is. It neither studies facts of nature nor causal 
connections, but is a grammatical investigation that studies “the 
kinds of statement that we make about phenomena” (PI §90). 
Granted, some concepts require clarification. For instance, what is 
“everyday use” (PI §116)? But this shows only that Wittgenstein 
has not resolved every philosophical problem connected with his 
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method, not that he has not given an illuminating description of it 
in any sense. The framework that Wittgenstein provides with the 
description of his method is not “at most a kind of tradition, an 
institution or a common background” (Schulte 2002: 405), but an 
account of the nature of the philosophical problems and their 
solution. 
3. Remarks on the concept of method 
One source of Schulte’s denial that Wittgenstein had a method is 
that Schulte retains a strict dichotomy between two kinds of 
method. The first kind is a method that is basically a special type of 
skill (and thus a “method” in scare quotes). The only alternative 
Schulte mentions is a method which consists of “rules [...] that spell 
out what a player should in certain situations do in order to win” 
(Schulte 2002: 403). Schulte’s category of rules conductive to 
winning should be construed broadly: A physiotherapist does not 
win against his patient, but he can successfully ease the other’s pain. 
And there might be rules for him to do so. In the case of 
philosophy, Schulte envisages rules like: 
1. If your opponent believes in substances, you are well-advised to 
begin by pointing out to him that not all nouns function according to 
the pattern exemplified by labels that may be stuck onto the objects 
they fit. (Schulte 2002: 403) 
That is, Schulte demands from an ambitious method in philosophy 
that it has explicit instructions for particular cases. For all of them? 
For many? For just a few? Anyhow, the Investigations doesn’t supply 
such explicit if-then rules. Then, according to Schulte’s dichotomy, 
there remains only one kind of method which could be ascribed to 
Wittgenstein: a method as a skill. Perhaps one can restate Schulte’s 
two kinds of methods in terms of rules. This restatement exceeds 
the literal phrasing in Schulte’s paper, but may be helpful in 
presenting a related view: An ambitious method should consist of a 
comprehensive set of rules that can be applied to any particular 
philosophical problem. A non-ambitious method would typically be 
taught by engaging with particular cases, whereby at best some such 
particular rules may be mentioned (although the particular 
philosophical investigations could be conducted without invoking 
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any rules). I disagree with that picture. To begin with, the 
requirement of comprehensiveness, which is in force only for the 
ambitious kind of method, differs depending on whether the set of 
philosophical problems is logically fixed or open. In the first case, a 
list of particular rules could be comprehensive. However, it is not 
clear that any participant of the debate would like to claim that the 
number of philosophical problems is fixed. In the second case, 
comprehensiveness can only be achieved if the rules do not apply 
to particular philosophical problems, but merely give more general 
guidance. This brings me to the disagreement: Rules of a method 
don’t need to be applicable to particular cases. On the contrary, 
they can apply to classes of cases, or even to all relevant cases. The 
rules that I will mention at the end of this section are of this kind. 
That philosophical problems are to be solved by studying the use 
of words is such a general rule. Moreover, once general, 
methodological rules are acknowledged, a method can achieve 
comprehensiveness not by solving every problem in advance, but 
by providing rules that outline a way for solving every problem 
(that is to be solved by that method). In what sense of “method” 
does Wittgenstein have a method? As an alternative to Schulte's 
two kinds of methods, we can distinguish methods according to 
three cross-cutting distinctions: sequential and non-sequential 
arrangement of rules; creative and mechanic application of rules; 
overarching and problem-oriented methods. Here are some 
definitions: 
Sequential method: has an ordered and finite set of rules. 
Non-sequential method: its rules are not ordered into a series or it 
has an unlimited number of rules. 
Creative application of rules: there is leeway in the application of 
rules. 
Mechanic application of rules: rules are applied without (much) 
leeway. 
Overarching method: used to create methods that deal with 
problems. 
Problem-oriented method: used to deal with problems. 
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I will consider a few examples which combine these features in 
various ways. First, the method of picking a lock by using a bump 
key: Insert the bump key and pull it back until you notice a click. 
Then, turn the key in the right direction while hitting it with a 
special hammer. Repeat until the lock opens. Of course, in order to 
follow this quick method you need to have the right instruments, 
and you need to practice. Nevertheless, once you have learned, you 
can mechanically apply the steps in the right order (sequential) and you 
will be able to open many locks (problem-oriented). Some other 
examples of methods with the same features are a method of 
folding a t-shirt in two seconds, a method of projecting a 
geometrical figure and a particular method of salary negotiation the 
main point of which is to avoid naming a number. Since these 
methods are both mechanical and sequential, we could call them 
algorithmic methods. These are not algorithms since they operate not 
exclusively with signs or functions. (Turing machines would have a 
hard time tying a knot.) But analogously to algorithms, they can 
solve a given range of problems by applying a finite set of 
mechanically applicable rules. 
Second, formal logic provides a method of checking arguments 
for their validity (problem-oriented). Part of this method is to 
formalise arguments of natural language. Normally, when we do 
that we don’t try any proposed translation blindly but go with the 
most plausible one, only to change it later if trouble comes up. That 
is, the rules of translation are not ordered in a sequence (non-
sequential). (It’s an open question whether one could construct an 
algorithm which performs these tasks.) It’s creative, since the choice 
of formalisation depends on our latitude of judgement. 
Third, take Descartes’ method in his Discours de la Méthode (2011: 
33). It consists only of four rules that are to guide human 
understanding in all its endeavours. One could argue that the rules 
are ordered in a sequence: First, get rid of all supposed truths if there 
remains some doubt. Second, divide the problems into 
subproblems. Third, start with those problems that are easy to 
solve. Fourth, strive for completeness in your enumeration of 
knowledge. These rules are to be applied creatively. For instance, we 
have to judge ourselves where to carve out the sub-problems. 
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Finally, while the method does not call explicitly for the creation of 
problem-oriented methods, the extreme generality of the method 
implies that some further methods need to be applied, for instance 
to check whether a supposed knowledge is free from any doubt. 
Thus, Descartes’ method seems to be overarching. 
Fourth, there is a method of dog training called “dog 
whispering”. Instead of viewing the relationship between owner 
and dog as one of issuing commands and following them, it sees it 
as one of mutual understanding, and thereby sets the goal for dog 
training. Consequently, what is perceived as a problem is not only 
the behaviour of the dog who chews on the cushions while the 
owner is absent, but also the behaviour of the owner who comes 
home, gets angry, swears in a raised voice at the dog and then 
misinterprets the ensuing fear of the dog as guilt. A means to 
resolve such problematic behaviour, then, is to both change the 
behaviour of the dog through conditioning and the behaviour of 
the owner through explanation. Naturally, these guidelines alone 
cannot teach one to be a skilful dog whisperer. But they provide 
guide rails to integrate solutions of particular problems into a wider 
framework, adapt existing procedures to new cases or even invent 
new procedures. Thus, this method is overarching, non-sequential and 
creative. 
Any method must delimit the range of problems it deals with 
and state what counts as a solution. For some methods, this can be 
done very easily. The problems of the bump-key method are locked 
doors (and other locked things) and the solution of the problem 
consists in an unlocked and open door. For logic, the problems are 
obvious: arguments. But the solution is less clear-cut than an open 
door – has the argument been misrepresented or is it really not 
valid? The range of Descartes’ method is less general than it first 
appears: it is limited to knowledge. And rule one states what amounts 
to a solution: no reason for doubt is left. 
Many rules of the methods mentioned above state what has to 
be done in order to succeed, in order to reach a given goal: they are 
regulative. These rules are also constitutive in a certain aspect: They 
determine what counts as following the method m. Nevertheless, 
such rules normally do not determine what counts as an activity for 
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which they provide guidance. For instance, the rules of the angling 
method of fishing do not determine what fishing is. In this respect, 
Wittgenstein’s method is a special case, because it is strongly linked 
to a conception of philosophy. For instance, the rules that state the 
aim and the problems of the method determine the goal, instead of 
giving guidance how to reach the goal. They are therefore 
constitutive. But constitutive rules can be action-guiding, too. If 
there is a mismatch between the goal as we pursue it in practice and 
our real need, a change of the pursued aim in our practice is crucial 
to achieve what we really need to achieve. The belief that it is a 
constitutive rule of chess that the queen can only be moved while 
the player stands on his head might prevent some players from 
moving the queen. Likewise, a difference in the conception of 
philosophy corresponds to a difference in how the subject is 
pursued, for instance in the role that is ascribed to scientific 
discoveries. If there are good reasons for or against one of the 
conceptions or methods, then this discussion is of obvious 
importance. Thus we can see how the five elements which I 
identified in Wittgenstein’s method are action-guiding. The rules 
that determine the nature of problems and aims are important to 
pursue aims that address our real need (cf. PI §108). But what are 
the rules of Wittgenstein’s method? Here is a very inadequate 
attempt to press the five elements I have mentioned into rules. 
They are at a high level of abstraction and would require further 
elucidation. 
R1) A philosophical problem is a misunderstanding or a lack of 
understanding of our use of words. 
R2) The aim of philosophy is to attain a completely clear 
understanding of the use of those words that are problematic. 
R3) What counts as a misunderstanding and what counts as an 
understanding is to be determined by studying our use of words. 
R4) One philosophical problem may have different sources. 
R5) A variety of methods have to be applied depending on the 
problem, its sources and the other problems that an individual has. 
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4. Conant: “Methods, not a method” 
Conant claims that for the later Wittgenstein, there is not one 
method, but a multitude of methods. Obviously, this alludes to the 
last and boxed sentence of PI §133 (Conant 2012: 635). I will 
discuss the interpretative challenge of this sentence in the next 
section. Conant provides an intricate story of the development of 
Wittgenstein’s thought from early to middle to later Wittgenstein in 
terms of method and grammar. Moreover, Conant is of the opinion 
that these two, grammar and method, are linked in an important 
way. One can put it succinctly: grammars require methods. The general 
story is that early Wittgenstein held that there is one method of 
philosophy and that there is a fixed number of possible forms of 
grammar. Middle Wittgenstein realised that the possible forms of 
grammar are not fixed, but clung to the idea that there was one 
method. Later Wittgenstein then realised that the idea of one 
method is undermined by there being an unlimited variety of forms 
of grammar, and consequently abandoned the idea that he had one 
method (Conant 2012: 640, 642). I will point out some gaps in the 
story. But let’s first see how Conant puts it: 
One might formulate the negative aspect of the insight which 
underlies the shift here in question as follows: the relinquishing of the 
first of these definite articles (the logic of our language) requires the 
correlative abandonment of the second of these definite articles (the 
method of philosophy). One can also formulate the point here at issue 
in more positive terms as follows: an open-ended, infinitely extendable 
conception of a family of possible forms of grammar comes to be 
seen to require a correlatively open-ended, infinitely extendable 
conception of a family of possible forms of philosophical method. 
That the one requires the other, however, takes time and work for 
Middle Wittgenstein to come to appreciate. (Conant 2012: 640-1) 
Some elucidations are in order. First, what does “open-ended, 
infinitely extendable” mean? I understand this as alluding to a 
potential infinity: On the one hand, it is obviously not the case that 
we have an infinite number of elements at hand. On the other 
hand, the set of elements is unlimited in the sense that we can 
always find a new element. The antonym of it is “limited”: At a 
given point, we have written down all elements of the set. This 
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point may have not been reached yet, but it is in principle 
attainable. Consequently, Conant does not contrast one method 
with a plurality of methods, but with an unlimited plurality. Second, 
what are “forms of grammar”? I take them to be equivalent to 
“grammatical forms”. Of course, early Wittgenstein did not talk 
about “grammar”, but about “logic”. Thus, are we actually 
comparing “logical forms” of early Wittgenstein with “grammatical 
forms” of middle and later Wittgenstein? 
How can the shift away from the logic towards a plurality of 
logics (or grammars) be understood? A false start would be to say 
that the Tractatus would advocate a limited number of logical forms 
which middle Wittgenstein replaced by an unlimited number of 
grammatical forms. The problem is that this is not true of the 
Tractatus: For one thing, there is an important distinction between 
logic and the application of logic (TLP 5.557). Only the latter decides 
which elementary propositions there are, and with that, which 
logical forms there are. Logic does not decide whether there is a 
27-termed relation (TLP 5.5541). For another, the “logical forms 
are without number” (TLP 4.128). That is, in the Tractatus, the logical 
forms are unlimited, too. 
A better way to tell Conant’s story takes into account the 
distinction between three different levels in the Tractatus: On the 
first level is the general form of a proposition. All propositions 
with a sense conform to this one form: they are truth-functions of 
elementary propositions. To deny this yields an alternative position 
like (i) that there are more than one general logical forms, but still a 
limited number (one could call them “categories”), or (ii) that there 
is an unlimited number of general logical forms. Since on this 
second alternative, the distinction between general grammatical 
forms and grammatical forms becomes doubtful, on that account, 
the first level collapses into the second. The second level comprises 
the logical forms: proper names, predicates, 2-termed relations, 27-
termed relations. Thus, ignoring depth analysis, “is a boy” and “is a 
man” have the same logical form, but not “is an uncle”. For the 
latter is a disguised relation. The third level is then the logical form 
of a specific sentence which in the terminology of the Tractatus, is 
called the “logical structure”. 
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For Conant, the contrast between the early notion of logic and 
the later notion of grammar is pertinent; that is, the move from logic 
to grammars. So here is my take on Conant’s story. Middle 
Wittgenstein abandoned the idea that all propositions conform to 
one form, the general form of a proposition. But he retained the 
other two levels in modified form. Instead of logical forms we have 
now grammatical forms, which also include differences such as 
between “has a key” and “has a pain”. Thus, there is indeed an 
important change in terms of grammar or logic: the early 
Wittgenstein thought that there is one logic of language, which is 
topic-neutral, and can be used to talk about any topic. Middle 
Wittgenstein, however, realised that the grammar of language can 
take very different general forms in different language games. The 
story now explains that the one general logical form corresponded 
to one method, but that this monism of method had to be given up 
once the monism of general propositional form had been given up. 
Third, what are “forms of method”? Perhaps we can 
understand this expression by analogy with “forms of grammar”. A 
form of grammar is what is common to several sentence-types. For 
instance, “Romeo loves Juliet” and “Peter beats Paul” have the 
same form (in one respect) as in both sentences, a two-termed 
relation occurs. Analogously, in the piecemeal processes of tackling 
confusions of two persons, what is common to two applications of 
method is a form of method. For instance, one philosophical move 
is to point to a difference of symbol of two signs that appear to be 
similar (cf. Conant 2012: 630, TLP 3.23). That is, forms of method 
turn out to be nothing else than methods in what I call the problem-
oriented sense. Thus, the substitution method and the elimination 
method for solving mathematical equations are two methods, or 
two forms of method. 
The story rests on an insight on Wittgenstein’s part. This insight 
can be presented in the form of an argument:  
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2) In philosophy, an unlimited number of general forms of 
grammar requires an unlimited number of methods. (Grammars 
require methods.)4 
3) The number of general forms of grammar of our language is 
unlimited. 
4) Hence, philosophy requires an unlimited number of methods. 
 
Middle Wittgenstein realises (3) contra early Wittgenstein, but fails 
to grasp (2). Only the later Wittgenstein makes the next step and 
reaches the conclusion (4). The argument is a valid modus ponens, but 
I see two problems with it. 
On a preliminary note, it would be uncharitable to read this 
argument as excluding any approach to philosophy which does not 
accord a central role to forms of grammar or logic (Kant, Husserl, 
Descartes) from having a method at all. After all, Conant’s 
formulations are directed at Wittgenstein’s development, not at the 
history of philosophy in general. Moreover, he could react by 
generalising premise (2) to any “object or medium of philosophical 
investigation (logic/grammar)” (Conant 2012: 640). That is, if the 
object of philosophical investigation sports an unlimited number of 
forms, then an unlimited number of methods is required to deal 
with them. 
The first problem is the main premise (2). Conant is clearly 
committed to something like this by his story and the long quote 
above. But why should we accept anything like that? For one thing, 
there is no indication that Wittgenstein thought that a particular 
grammatical form must be investigated by a particular method. The 
methods that early and later Wittgenstein provide are not grammar-
dependent. For the Tractatus, two methods come to mind: first, the 
method of constructing an ideal notation (cf. TLP 3.325, 4.1121), 
and second, the method of using this ideal notation to demonstrate 
that certain sentences are nonsensical, and to understand other 
sentences clearly (TLP 4.112, 6.53). Perhaps one could argue that 
Wittgenstein’s ideal notation requires a general propositional form. 
                                                          
4 In other words: If our language has an unlimited number of general forms of grammar, 
then philosophy should have an unlimited number of methods. 
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Accordingly, the methods of the Tractatus would depend on it. 
Even if so, this shows only that the Tractarian methods have to be 
discarded together with the general propositional form. It does not 
show anything about the methods of the Investigations, especially not 
that there is an unlimited number of them. 
What about the Investigations? If Conant is right, methods that 
deal with a particular form of grammar should be all over the place. 
Some of the means that Wittgenstein employs are: inventing 
language games (PI §2, 48), looking how a word is taught (PI §9, 
35, 179), comparing the grammar of two words (PI §78), 
substituting one form of expression for another (PI §90), a 
surveyable representation (PI §122),
5
 imagining different general 
facts of nature (PI §142, PPF §366), showing something about the 
grammar of one word by connecting it to the grammar of another 
(PI §492) and looking at different contexts of the use of a word (PI 
§593). In my opinion, none of these procedures or methods are 
grammar-dependent. Some of descriptions of them directly use the 
word “grammar” – but, of course, comparing the grammar of two 
words in no way restricts this procedure to any particular form of 
grammar. 
Moreover, that some methods may be applied to different 
forms of grammar is especially virulent for methods that deal with 
the obstacles of a proper understanding, with the sources of 
confusions. For instance, in the Big Typescript (BT 406), 
Wittgenstein claims that philosophical problems are not difficult 
for the intellect, but for the will. This requires strategies or methods 
to outwit the will: we have to fight certain intellectual temptations, 
tendencies. Similarly, an important obstacle to properly understand 
that part of grammar that causes trouble are ideals, pictures of how 
it must be which have settled in the mind. Just to present a clear 
view of the relevant grammar may here not achieve the desired 
                                                          
5 There are different ways to interpret “surveyable representation” in the Investigations. 
Kuusela sees it as a sort of umbrella term for all methods that Wittgenstein uses (Kuusela 
2008: 269). Glock favours a more specific interpretation (Glock 1996: 280). I tend 
towards a specific interpretation different from Glock’s. But this matter need not be 
decided here. Regardless of interpretation, surveyable representations are an important 
means that Wittgenstein advocates. 
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effect. The ideal has to be tackled separately, for instance by 
constructing a simple language game as in (PI §2, 48). That is, there 
are many procedures that are grammar-independent. But then, even if 
Conant were right in claiming that the later Wittgenstein rejected 
the idea of the early and middle Wittgenstein that philosophy had 
one method, that he did so in virtue of abandoning the view of the 
grammar is highly implausible. For the relation between grammars 
and methods is much too feeble to sustain such a major change. 
The second problem concerns the claim that an unlimited 
number of methods is incompatible with there being one method. 
Initially, this seems plausible, since we have to understand the latter 
claim as there being at most one method. Explaining away the 
tension is essentially the same as dealing with the interpretative 
challenge of the last and boxed sentence of (PI §133). I will address 
this in the next section. 
5. “Method” in the Investigations 
In what way does the term “method” occur in the Investigations? 
Concerning method, we can distinguish three levels. On the first, 
there is an overarching method that guides the creation of new 
problem-oriented methods: This is the one of which I gave a short 
five-rule description in section 3. On the second level, there are 
various problem-oriented methods such as imagining a language 
that would fit a particular philosophical theory or picture (and 
others mentioned in the last section). The third level comprises 
applications of problem-oriented methods; that is the methods 
used in actual or exemplary philosophical investigations. Here, it is 
important to keep in mind that philosophy treats problems of 
understanding. And it is individual persons who misunderstand the 
use of words. That is, this level consists in addressing the 
confusions of particular persons; the means or methods applied 
need to take into consideration the sources of the problems and the 
other problems the person has. 
The word “method” does only occur in a few remarks in the 
Investigations. One use concerns the connection between sign or 
picture and meaning, and whether there is a method of projection 
to get from one to the other (PI §139, 141, 366, 548). Another use 
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is as a method of measurement (PI §242). Both don’t deal with the 
sense of “method” that interests us. Closer to our interest are two 
remarks that concern a problem-oriented method. (PI §48) mentions 
“the method of §2”, and applies it to a new case. The method, in 
this case, is to consider a language game where an antecedent 
description of language as a whole is indeed correct. The point of 
studying “the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of use in 
which one can clearly survey the purpose and functioning of 
words,” is to “disperse[...] the fog” which has been brought about 
by a “general concept of meaning” (PI §5). That is, it is a method 
or procedure that is destined not to tackle a particular form of 
grammar, but a grammar-independent hindrance for taking the 
grammar of language for what it actually is: diverse. This is 
important insofar as it shows that Wittgenstein used “method” in a 
sense which presupposes that there are several methods. But this of 
course does not rule out the possibility that he used that word in 
another sense, too. The most pertinent remark about method is PI 
§133, which would merit a discussion of its own. For the sake of 
brevity, I will only examine the two occurrences of that word. 
Sondern es wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt und die 
Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen. (PI §133) 
“Examples” is written in plural, “method” in singular. Is this the 
last surviving reference to Wittgenstein’s one method? Or is he 
talking about one of many methods? If “eine” were in italics, the 
former reading should be favoured. But since it is not, both 
readings can be upheld. I lean towards the former, since it chimes 
with my over-all reading. Instead of laying the foundations of 
philosophy, what we get from the later Wittgenstein are a bunch of 
examples of philosophical problems plus their resolutions. In these 
philosophical investigations, a method has been at work, and, 
Wittgenstein insinuates, the method can be learned by considering 
the examples. Importantly, however, “showing the method” does 
not exclude making methodological remarks, of which (PI §133) 
itself is a prime example. 
Es gibt nicht eine Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es 
Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien. (PI §133) 
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Here, it seems that Wittgenstein explicitly denies that philosophy 
has one method. My response to this is that in the Investigations, it is 
crucial to notice deliberate ambiguities, such as that of “being 
hidden” (PI §91, 126 vs. §129) or the use of one word in positive 
and negative contexts, e.g. “essence” (PI §89, 371 vs. §92, 97, 113, 
116). Likewise, there is a deliberate ambiguity between the method 
that is “demonstrated by examples” (PI §133) and the insistence 
that there are many methods (PI §133). The first is about the 
overarching method, which provides a general strategy to tackle 
philosophical confusions and an understanding of the nature of 
philosophical investigations. The second is about is about the 
variety of procedures, means or problem-oriented methods that the 
method enables to create or apply. While Wittgenstein did not draw 
this distinction himself, he is committed to it. The reason for this is 
that it removes the tension to the passage in the preface where he 
talks about the “nature of the investigation”. Thus, the sentence in 
the box attacks the misconception that the talk of “a method” 
implies that there is one fixed procedure which one can follow – the 
method consists, on the contrary, of applying and creating a variety 
of problem-oriented methods. It is poly-procedural. 
The claim that Wittgenstein in the Investigations held that he had 
a method to teach is supported by a passage from the preface. 
While, indeed, the word “method” has vanished completely from 
the final version of the preface, there is a remark about the “nature 
of the investigation”: 
Und dies hing freilich mit der Natur der Untersuchung zusammen. Sie 
nämlich zwingt uns, ein weites Gedankengebiet, kreuz und quer, nach 
allen Richtungen hin zu durchreisen. [...] So ist dieses Buch eigentlich 
nur ein Album [von Landschaftsskizzen]. (PI pref.) 
And the sense of “nature of investigation” is not a lightweight one. 
For it has direct repercussions for how one can go about the 
investigation. There is no natural, antecedently established order 
which a presentation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy could follow. 
Rather, those philosophical confusions and problems that are in 
force in our dialogue partner or in ourselves need to be tackled. 
Moreover, treatment of the problems leads to “long and 
meandering journeys” (“langen und verwickelten Fahrten”) (PI 
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pref.). “Verwickelt” carries with it the idea that the problems are 
interconnected, and the relations between them weave a chaotic 
and asymmetrical net. Several strands of connection go out for 
instance from the referential doctrine of meaning, which can stand 
at the beginning of many philosophical problems – disregard for 
language use, or the idea of mental entities. 
Now, we can go back to the question of continuity or 
discontinuity between a middle Wittgenstein who explicitly claimed 
to have found a method and the later Wittgenstein who does not 
talk much about method. As we have seen, the reasons that Schulte 
and Conant put forth to explain why Wittgenstein had to change 
his opinion turn out to be weak. But then, there is no good story of 
discontinuity. Thus, the only plausible story we have is one of 
continuity: The later Wittgenstein became more cautious in 
advertising his method as a central element of his philosophy, but 
continued to reflect on and describe his method. In sum, there is 
good evidence that the later Wittgenstein had a method in an 
ambitious sense, one which which he tried to pass on through his 
samples of philosophical investigations and the methodological 
remarks that accompany them. 
Conclusion 
Schulte’s claim that Wittgenstein’s method is little more than a skill 
in effect states that no method can be ascribed to the middle and 
later Wittgensteins. But Wittgenstein’s remarks on how to pursue 
philosophy constitute just that: a method. The philosophical 
importance of Wittgenstein’s work is not exhausted by his 
contributions to particular areas of philosophy such as philosophy 
of mind, language or mathematics, nor by the alleged exemplary 
status of his philosophical investigations. His reflections on how to 
engage with philosophical problems are a contribution to 
philosophical method with which contemporary philosophers can 
profitably and critically engage. Moreover, Schulte’s two 
requirements for a method are problematic. The first one, that 
methods are connected to theories, excludes Wittgenstein’s method 
from being a method in virtue of one of its own features qua 
method. The other requirement is reasonable, but fulfilled: the 
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claim that Wittgenstein does not provide an informative description 
is unconvincing. The comparison of the philosophical method with 
a way to play the violin leaves the method as something magical, 
which is only acceptable if we are not ourselves to play the violin. 
Conant is quite right to stress the diversity of methods in the 
Philosophical Investigations. However, the distinction between 
overarching and problem-oriented methods paves the way for 
having the cake and eating it. The overarching method, which is the 
subject of methodological discussions, guides the invention and 
application of the various problem-oriented methods. Moreover, 
the idea that methods are closely tied to general grammatical forms 
is misguided. Not a single method which I have come across in 
Wittgenstein’s writings is directed at a particular form of grammar. 
Conant, however, needs a whole batch of them to validate his claim 
that there is an important connection between methods and 
grammatical forms. 
What remains is the enormous groundwork of digging up and 
specifying the various methods used by Wittgenstein in the course 
of doing philosophy. Since this cannot be done without engaging 
with the particular philosophical topics to which these methods are 
applied, it is truly a great task. Moreover, the distinction between 
problem-oriented and overarching methods could be applied to the 
Tractatus, too. Thus one could try to describe the method of the 
Tractatus independently of the one procedure of (6.53). Perhaps a 
discussion of the second method of the Tractatus (3.325, 4.1121) of 
studying ordinary language under the aspect of an ideal notation 
could bring to the fore the fundamental division between setting up 
the ideal notation and applying it. 
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